Вообще говоря, исключительно выдающаяся книга. Отсутствие ее русского перевода - огромный ущерб. Собственно, лучшая ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКАЯ (то есть настоящая) история участия СССР в войне. Просто захватывающее чтение.
Один из любимых эпизодов - стр. 207-209 (о поездке Черчилля в Москву в октябре 1944 г.; сноски опускаю):
<...> The Prime Minister had come to Moscow reasonably optimistic, for "Uncle Joe has shown himself more forthcoming than ever before," although he believed that "we must strike wjile the iron is hot." So on the first day, October 9, the two leaders forged the remarkable "percentage agreement" which the Prime Minister later descibed vividly in his memoirs.
According to this description, Churchill passed a slip of paper to Stalin, which the dictator quickly approved woth a tick of his pencil. It set the ratios of Soviet and Western influence as 90:10 in Romania, 10:90 in Greece, 50:50 in Yugoslavia and Hungary, and 75:25 in Bulgaria. Whether judged as a clever move to salvage some Western influence in the area or as a cynical scheme to decide its fate over the heads of the peoples involved, Churchill's initiative has usually been credited with striking a congenial note in Stalin because of its boldness and simplicity. The facts of the episode, however, are not simple, and their reconstruction presents surprises.
To begin with, the official British minutes of the meeting do not mention the bargain. Nor does the Russian record - at leastaccording to a Soviet author who claims to have seen it and who maintains that Churchill merely offered Stalin a "rather dirty and clumsy document," which Stalin virtuously ignored. Yet the notorious slip of paper is in the Prime Minister's files for anyone to see, complete with the penciled tick next to the figures for Romania. Moreover, an early draft of the minutes, preserved among the papers of the British Embassy in Moscow although not in the main Foreign Office file, does include a passage that conforms with the account on Churchill's memoirs but was deleted in the final text. And the Russians certailny knew what had happened, for the day after the Stalin-Churchill encounter, Molotov atempted to revise the percentages at a meeting with Eden. Though much less well known, this sequel is actually more revealing of Stalin's true aims than the original deal in which the Russian ruler had played onlu a passive role.
Molotov opened the meeting by invoking the Soviet military who, after all their sacrifices, might be disappointed if the shares of influence allotted to their country were not increased. He particularly wanted the percentage in Hungary changed from 50:50 to 75:25 in the Russian favor. Startled, Eden tried to change the subject, but Molotov proceeded to demand 90 percent in Bulgaria. This touched on Britain's prestige as a belligerent of considerably longer standing than the Soviet Union, and Eden rejoined: "We must have more influence there than in Romania." Thus the stage was set for a horsetrading session, as Molotov had undoubtedly hoped from the start.
Delighted as having elicited a response, Molotov promptly proposed 75:25 for Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. When Eden refused, he offered an alternative of 90:10 in Bulgaria, 50:50 in Yugoslavia, with Hungary subject to amendment. Or, perhaps, 75:25, 60:40, 75:25. Then it was Eden's turn to throw in a few numbers: 80:20, 50:50, 75:25. Stalin's aide was ready to accept 50:50 for Yugoslavia, but only if Bulgaria were to be 90:10; or else 60:40 and 75:25 respectively. At this point, the meeting reached a deadlock and was adjourned until the following day, when Molotov returned with his final offer: 80:20 in Hungary and Bulgaria, 50:50 in Yugoslavia. By then Eden had consulted with Churchill, and was no longer willing to bargain; the figures remained in limbo.
At no time did the negotiating partners agre on just what those percentages were supposed to mean. <...>