В частности, юзер eremei считает, что
правил не было в принципе или почти не было. Существование т.н. "групп риска" применительно к 30-м и далее сильно преувеличено в современных публикациях. Если вначале действительно направленно истребляли дворян и духовенство, а затем - крестьян, то потом "целевые чистки" практически сошли "на нет"
Миша, этот вопрос не слишком хорошо изучен, но все-таки изучен. К счастью, имеются в мире действительно крупные специалисты по советской истории, и среди них Терри Мартин. После его работы "REGISTRATION" AND "MOOD": OGPU INFORMATION REPORTS AND THE SOVIET SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM" (драфт выложен по адресу http://www.virginia.edu/~crees/Martin.pdf) говорить о "чудесах" уже просто бессмысленно. Речь идет именно о массовых операциях, а не о замнаркомах, аресты которых решались на другом уровне, на уровне политического руководства (для союзных наркоматов это был уровень Ежова-Сталина-Молотова). Все было организовано, самотеком не шло.
Вот отрывок из работы Мартина, если у кого pdf долго грузится:
The OGPU system of uchet has, unsurprisingly, received little scholarly attention, given the truly exceptional barriers to research. However, a rapidly growing body of circumstantial evidence clearly suggests that uchet was the primary function of the OGPU surveillance system, and that the massive effort to monitor nastroenie was, in fact, derivative of this uchet effort. Indeed, it is difficult to understand the patterns or practice of Soviet terror without an understanding of the uchet system.
In OGPU terminology, uchet referred to the practice of identifying (vyiavliat’) and cataloging (vziat’ na uchet) all individuals (ob’’ekty or elementy) whom the OGPU felt at any given time should be under their surveillance (na uchet or poduchetniki). Like most of Soviet policy, and in particular Soviet terror, uchet was categoric. Individuals were primarily, though not exclusively, taken na uchet as members of a given social category, regardless of what they had done or what their current nastroenie might be. In the 1920s, the overarching uchet category was the “anti-Soviet element” (by the second half of the 1930s, it was the “counter revolutionary element”). Anti-soviet element was not a nastroenie category. Instead, it included a variety of categories of “former” people: former (and current) members of non-Bolshevik political parties, former White officers, former bandits, former leaders of uprisings, former (and current) clergy, former Tsarist policemen, and former estate-owners. It is not clear when the OGPU set itself the goal of taking all members of a given social category na uchet (though it certainly is clear that they never came close to achieving that goal).42 If we take what was probably the single most important uchet category of the NEP years, non-Bolshevik political Party members, then we can say that in 1921 the VChK only set itself the goal of taking na uchet all current, active members of non-Bolshevik political parties and of producing a single central register of all such members. By 1925, however, a Secret-Political Department circular outlining formal GPU policy towards Right SRs declared that the Party had been effectively liquidated and that the GPU’s new goal was not only to take all former members of the Right SRs na uchet, but also to recruit a comprehensive informer network among them. Almost certainly, a similar policy was being applied to Mensheviks, Anarchists and Left SRs.
The anti-Soviet element was the primary, but by no means the only uchet category of the
mid-1920s. Some of the other categories were excluded Bolshevik Party members for political reasons (an uchet category from at least as early as 1926), individuals who carried on a foreign correspondence, those who visited a foreign consul, and “perebezhiki” (illegal immigrants). By 1939, we know that there were eighteen formal uchet categories:
1-6. “Former People” (representatives of Tsarist administration, former kulaks, former participants in uprisings, former Tsarist policemen and prison guards, former officers (Whites, Petliurites and other armies) former political bandits and volunteers for the Whites and other armies.
7-9. Political Party Categories (members of anti-Soviet political parties, members of anti-Soviet chauvinist [i.e. non-Russian] parties, individuals excluded from the Communist Party for political reasons)
10. Individuals having served prison sentence for political crimes
11. Family members of individuals serving ten year or longer sentences for counter-revolutionary crimes (or executed for them)
12-16. Potential Spies (diaspora nationalities with a nationalist mood, illegal and political immigrants along with repatriated citizens and smugglers, all foreigners as well as Soviet citizens that worked in foreigners’ offices, individuals who correspond with someone abroad or visit a foreign embassy as well as stamp collectors and esparanto specialists, individuals entering the USSR in large groups (such as the kharbintsy).
17. Clergy, sectarians and religious activists
18. Members of mystical societies and circles such as masons, Theosophists and others.
A new set of uchet categories was established in 1944 to encompass the new enemy categories that emerged during World War II. While some of these categories involved individual actions that to the OGPU would imply a negative nastroenie (such as visiting a foreign consul), none of them were directly related to the monitoring of nastroenie. Then why do I say that OGPU nastroenie reports were a by-product of uchet.
For two reasons. First, because categoric uchet was combined with an additional nastroenie element. Anti-Soviet elements, for instance, were divided into “active” and “passive” elements, who were in turn taken on “active” or “passive” uchet according to a 1931 document, or “list” (spisochnyi) versus “operative” (operativnyi) uchet. The decision to take an individual na uchet typically required only asking the question, “who are you?” “to what social category do you belong?”. To take an individual na aktivnyi or operativnyi uchet required asking a further question, “what have you been doing/thinking?” “what is your personal nastroenie?” This question forced the OGPU informer network to move beyond identification to a more careful and purposeful surveillance of actions and conversation. This process in turn had its own momentum and logic. Passive uchet meant the filling out of a surveillance card for the OGPU local and central card files, which typically meant no more than an anketa (questionnaire form) or even just a line in a spisok (list). This gave one the status of a poduchetnik. If one became identified as an active anti-Soviet element, a delo-formular (surveillance file) might be initiated, which meant the creation of an individual file of compromising materials (primarily agent reports) and active surveillance efforts to acquire such materials.49 If the file thickened and numerous anti-Soviet ties (sviazi) were revealed, an agenturnoe delo (group surveillance file) would be created, which meant that conscious preparations were being made for arrest. In this manner, not only are uchet and nastroenie intertwined, but terror as well.
In fact, the general categories of passive and active uchet help explain much concerning the pattern and practice of Soviet terror. For instance, the many dozens of mass deportations carried out by the OGPU-NKVD-NKGB-MVD-MGB from 1930 to 1952 almost all shared a similar pattern: an entire social category was deported based on their categorical identity alone (no pretense was ever made that they were all guilty of anti-soviet actions), while the “most active counter-revolutionary elements” were arrested and incarcerated (or executed). This pattern began with collectivization with its quotas for arrests and deportation (the third category in dekulakization disappeared for good after 1931). There is much circumstantial evidence that the division between “active” and “passive” during these deportations reflected the pre-existing distinction between active and passive uchet and that, although much uchet work was done in the months leading up to the deportations (and dekulakization as the first and biggest effort was much, much more chaotic than all subsequent mass deportations), the majority of those arrested during mass operations were already na uchet as active counter-revolutionary elements. Likewise, the beginning of a mass arrest operation typically began with the liquidation of the existing active or operative uchet. The mass operation accompanying the Ukrainian grain requisitions crisis was launched in November 1932 by the arrest of 2117 individuals in 436 pre-existing “group surveillance files” (agenturnye dela) and another 1308 individuals on whom there was a personal surveillance file (delo-formular). Thus, 3425 individuals could be immediately slated for arrest in Ukraine without even touching the passive or list uchet files.
The need to distinguish active anti-Soviet elements from passive, then, provides one explanation for OGPU surveillance of nastroenie at the individual level. The second is the existence of what would appear to be a further formal uchet category of “one with an anti-Soviet mood” (anti-sovetskii nastroen). By formal category, I mean that alongside the term “anti-Soviet element” or “Menshevik” in OGPU surveillance reports, one finds a systematic use of the term “anti-Soviet nastroen” to identify individuals by uchet category. In contrast to other uchet categories, the question asked of an individual here was not “who are you? what social category do you belong to?”, but rather “what have you been doing/saying? what is your personal nastroenie?”. An industrial worker or a bedniak peasant could be taken na uchet as “anti-Soviet nastroen”, though one must here make the major qualification that in such cases there was a strong tendency to then ransack the individual’s background to find some categoric “former” sin.