Boris Lvin (bbb) wrote,
Boris Lvin
bbb

О фальсифицированных выборах в Китае

Loren Brandt and Matthew Turner "The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections"
William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 602, August 2003
http://eres.bus.umich.edu/docs/workpap-dav/wp602.pdf

Авторы пишут в кратком изложении:

The belief that elections reduce rent seeking by government officials is widely held, likewise the belief that rent seeking decreases as elections are less subject to corruption. In this paper we develop and test a model in which these beliefs are carefully examined. Our model indicates that, while elections may provide a disincentive for rent seeking, this disincentive (1) need not actually materialise, and (2), is not necessarily correlated with the integrity of the electoral protocol. We next consider the ability of village-level elections in rural China to reduce rent seeking, and the extent to which this ability varies as the elections are more or less corruptible. We find that in practice, even elections that appear quite corruptible provide a strong disincentive to rent seeking. Moreover, our results indicate which types of electoral reform lead to more effective popular oversight of leaders, and which do not.

Далее, авторы заявляют:

We find that even very poorly conducted elections can have large incentive effects, and furthermore, that the benefits from additional reforms to improve election integrity may be small. Having said this, our findings allow us to rank the importance of four possible election reforms. We find the strongest evidence that restrictions on proxy voting will improve the ability of electorates in rural China to oversee their leaders. The evidence that reductions in government involvement in the nominating process will improve the quality of government is almost equally strong. We find no evidence that switching from mobile to fixed polling places or increasing opportunities to make campaign speeches affects government behavior.

И в конце:

We find compelling evidence that elections in rural China create a strong incentive for leaders to act in the interests of the electorate.

Вообще, их рассказ о том, как устроены выборы и землепользование в китайских деревнях, очень интересен. Лучше бы они меньше регрессий считали, а больше описаний приводили.
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