Boris Lvin (bbb) wrote,
Boris Lvin
bbb

Еще о savings statutes

Пока не удалось найти вразумительного объяснения, откуда эти законы взялись.

Зато в одном из решений верховного суда (точнее, в особом мнении одного из судей) нашелся достаточно развернутый анализ и компендиум с разбивкой по штатам - по состоянию на 1971 год. Логика автора совпадает с рассуждениями одного из комментаторов моего предыдущего постинга на эту тему - мол, даже если действие уже не является преступлением, наказанию подлежит сам факт нарушения действующего на тот момент закона. Кроме того, автор утверждает, что традиционная доктрина общего права подразумевала не автоматическое освобождение от наказания осужденных по отменяемому закону, а всего лишь прекращение судебного следствия по этому закону. В этом данный автор, похоже, вступает в противоречие с многими другими судебными решениями.

Судя по компендиуму в сноске 2, savings по уголовным приговорам с тюремным заключением на тот момент существовал не во всех штатах - в трех savings был ограниченным, а в Южной Каролине отсутствовал вообще. Интересно, был ли введен с тех пор?

It is also true that when the law no longer censures certain acts, the Government surrenders its interest in deterring prior delinquents or the public generally from engaging in a particular form of conduct that once was criminal but is now unobjectionable behavior. But there remains the interest in maintaining the rule of law and in demonstrating that those who defy the law do not do so with impunity. Clearly, the Constitution does not require the authorities to vindicate this interest upon the demise of a criminal law and some of us may think it unwise to do so. But is the interest so insubstantial that the Constitution forbids a State or the Federal Government from continuing to punish behavior which was once but is not now criminal conduct? I think not.

The question is an old one for both courts and legislatures and my answer is not novel, either in the context of the repeal of a criminal statute or in the context of a court decision overruling a prior case with respect to the constitutionality of a statute.

The common law never attached complete retrospectivity to the repeal of a criminal statute. Absent statutory guidance, the judge-made rule was that those whose convictions had been finally affirmed when repeal took place received no benefit from the new rule; but repeal of a statute abated pending prosecutions and required reversal of convictions still on appeal when the law was changed. United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934); Massey v. United States, 291 U.S. 608 (1934); United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88 (1871); Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch 281 (1809); In re Kline, 70 [401 U.S. 715, 736]  Ohio St. 25, 70 N. E. 511 (1904); State v. Addington, 2 Bailey (S. C.) 516 (1831); Ex parte Andres, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 93, 237 S. W. 283 (1922); see also 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2046 (1943 ed.).

The courts nevertheless honored provisions in repealing statutes saving prosecutions and forfeitures for conduct committed while the former statute was in effect. The Irresistible, 7 Wheat. 551 (1822); 1 Sutherland, supra, 2050. Moreover, in 1871, Congress enacted the following general statute which, among other things, saved ongoing criminal prosecutions from abatement following repeal of a penal statute:
"[T]he repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability." 16 Stat. 432.
This section was carried forward and eventually broadened by amendment "to provide that the expiration of a temporary statute shall not have the effect of preventing prosecution of an offense committed under the temporary statute" by making "applicable to violations of temporary statutes the same rule that is now in effect in respect to offenses against statutes that have been repealed." H. R. Rep. No. 261, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1943). [Footnote 1] Today, 46 States, as well as the Federal Government, make provision for saving pending criminal prosecutions from the repeal of the underlying statute. [Footnote 2] The prevailing legislative policy and positive law thus is that neither the repeal of a statute nor the expiration of a temporary act shall release or extinguish penalties, forfeitures, or liabilities incurred under statutes no longer in force. Conduct perfectly innocent under current law is nevertheless punishable if it occurred while a valid criminal statute proscribed it. The courts have regularly enforced 1 U.S.C. 109, the federal saving statute, never suggesting that it was constitutionally infirm or even fundamentally unfair and frankly recognizing that the Government is free to maintain the integrity of the law by insisting that those who violate it suffer the consequences. [Footnote 3]

[Footnote 1] In a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives in support of this broadening amendment, Attorney General Biddle referred to the common-law rule as a "deficiency [which] has been cured as concerns offenses cognizable under a statute that has been expressly repealed, as distinguished from one that expires by its own terms." See H. R. Rep. No. 261, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1943). He then indicated that there was doubt about whether the general saving provision identical to that enacted in 1871 (by then 1 U.S.C. 29 (1940 ed.)) applied to violations of temporary statutes that expired before prosecutions could be concluded. The Attorney General next stated that a number of wartime statutes of a temporary nature had been enacted, and that to forestall questions about their enforceability after expiration "it appears desirable to enact legislation which would expressly permit prosecutions after the lapse of such temporary statutes for violations committed while the act is in force." H. R. Rep. No. 261, supra, at 2.

[Footnote 2] The 46 States are: Alabama: Ala. Code, Tit. 1, 11 (1958); Alaska: Alaska Stat. 01.05.021 (1962); Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1-246, 1-247 (1956); see also id., 1-244, 1-249; Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann. 1-103 (1947); California: Cal. Govt. Code 9608 (1966); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 135-1-7, 135-4-7 (1963); Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. 54-194 (1968); Florida: Fla. Const., Art. 10, 9; Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. 26-103 (1953); Hawaii: Hawaii Rev. Laws 1-11 (1968); Idaho: Idaho Code 67-513 (1947); Illinois: Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 131, 4 (1969); Indiana: Ind. Ann. Stat. 1-303, 1-307 (1967); Iowa: Iowa Code 4.1 (1) (1971); Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. 77-201 (1969); Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. 446.110 (1962); Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. 24:171 (1950); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 1, 302 (Supp. 1970-1971); Maryland: Md. Ann. Code, Art. 1, 3 (1957); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., c. 4, 6 (1966); Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws 8.4a (1948); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. 645.35 (1967); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. 2608 (1957); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. 1.160 (1969); Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 43-514 (1961); Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. 49-301 (1968); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. 169.235 (1968); New Hampshire: N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 21:38 (1955); New Jersey: N. J. Rev. Stat. 1:1-15 (1937); New Mexico: N. M. Const., Art. 4, 33; New York: N. Y. Gen. Constr. Law 94 (1951); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. 164-4, 164-5 (1964); North Dakota: N. D. Cent. Code 1-02-17 (1959) (saves penalties, fines, liabilities, or forfeitures incurred under a repealed statute and provides that the repealed act remains in force for the purpose of enforcing such fines, penalties, or forfeitures; however, unless the repealing statute expressly provides otherwise, in cases tried both before and after the repeal, the repealing statute has the effect of "extinguishing any jail or prison sentence that may be, or that has been, imposed by reason of said law . . . ." Ibid.; but see In re Chambers, 69 N. D. 309, 285 N. W. 862 (1939), where the court held that insofar as 1-02-17 purported to extinguish prison sentences imposed after trial which preceded the effective date of the repealing statute, the section was unconstitutional under N. D. Const. 76, which vests power to pardon in the Governor and the board of pardons); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 1.20 (1969); Oklahoma: Okla. Const., Art. 5, 54; Oregon: Ore. Rev. Stat. 161.040 (1967); Rhode Island: R. I. Gen. Laws Ann. 43-3-23 (1956); South Dakota: S. D. Compiled Laws Ann. 2-14-18 (1967); Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. 1-301 (1955); Utah: Utah Code Ann. 68-3-5 (1968); Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 1, 214 (Supp. 1970); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. 1-16 (1950); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code 10.01.040 (1956); West Virginia: W. Va. Code Ann. 2-2-8 (1966); Wisconsin: Wisc. Stat. 990.04 (1967); Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. 8-21 (1957). Of the four other States, Delaware has a provision but it applies only to save prosecutions for any offenses committed under laws repealed when the State's comprehensive Code of 1953 was adopted. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 1, 104 (1953). See also Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 46, 596 (1969), a general saving provision applicable only to repeal of "civil provisions." However, under Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 46, 582, if the repeal of a penal statute is accompanied by a re-enactment at the same time of the repealed law's provisions in "substantially the same terms," a prosecution will be saved. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 4 Pa. D. & C. 2d 182 (1954). Tex. Pen. Code, Art. 14.16 (1952), provides: "The repeal of a law where the repealing statute substitutes no other penalty will exempt from punishment all persons who may have violated such repealed law, unless it be otherwise declared in the repealing statute." But Tex. Pen. Code, Art. 17.19 saves prosecutions for offenses committed under statutes repealed when the new Penal Code took effect. South Carolina apparently has no general saving provision applicable to criminal prosecutions.

[Footnote 3] United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398  (1888) (enforcing one of the predecessors of 1 U.S.C. 109); Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 553 -555 (1954); Moorehead v. Hunter, 198 F.2d 52 (CA10 1952); Lovely v. United States, 175 F.2d 312, 316-318 (CA4 1949); Rehberg v. United States, 174 F.2d 121 (CA5 1949); Ladner v. United States, 168 F.2d 771 (CA5 1948). 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 2048 (1943 ed.). See also Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 119  (1947); Duffel v. United States, 95 U.S. App. D.C. 242, 221 F.2d 523 (1954); cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 331 -333 (1936); United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531  (1944) (reversing an order quashing an indictment charging violation of maximum price regulation that had been revoked prior to the date the indictment was returned on the ground that the statute under which the regulation was issued remained in effect after revocation). In United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217  (1934), this Court was faced with the question of what effect repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment by the Twenty-first Amendment on December 5, 1933, would have on criminal prosecutions continued or begun under the National Prohibition Act after the repealing amendment had been ratified. In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court applied the common-law rule of Tynen and Yeaton and held that pending prosecutions, including those still on direct review, would be abated. The question of whether the Twenty-first Amendment had any effect on convictions which had become final before the date of ratification was specifically reserved. 291 U.S., at 226 . Thereafter, the courts of appeals held that defendants whose convictions had become final before the Twenty-first Amendment was ratified had to serve their sentences. United States ex rel. Randall v. United States Marshal, 143 F.2d 830 (CA2 1944); Odekirk v. Ryan, 85 F.2d 313 (CA6 1936); United States ex rel. Cheramie v. Dutton, 74 F.2d 740 (CA5 1935), cert. denied sub nom. United States ex rel. Cheramie v. Freudenstein, 295 U.S. 733  (1935); Rives v. O'Hearne, 64 App. D.C. 48, 73 F.2d 984 (1934); Moss v. United States, 72 F.2d 30 (CA4 1934); The Helen, 72 F.2d 772 (CA3 1934) (common-law rule of Chambers applied to a forfeiture); United States ex rel. Benton v. Hill, 72 F.2d 826 (CA3 1934); United States ex rel. Voorhees v. Hill, 72 F.2d 826 (CA3 1934); United States ex rel. Nerbonne v. Hill, 70 F.2d 1006 (CA3 1934). In Chambers, the Court rejected the Government's suggestion that the general saving provision - the predecessor of 109 - supported the continuation of prosecutions pending when the repealing amendment was ratified. The saving statute was discussed as passed in recognition of the principle that unless a repealed law is "continued in force by competent authority," 291 U.S., at 224 , repeal halts enforcement. Congress had the power to propose the Twenty-first Amendment so as to include a saving provision, but not to vary the amendment's terms once it was adopted. Since as adopted the amendment gave Congress no power to extend the operation of the National Prohibition Act, which was deprived of its force by the action of the people in repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, the Court concluded that the general saving provision had no application. Ibid. There can be no doubt that a Court which had just decided Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358  (1932), would consider the judiciary as "competent authority" to fashion a rule that a statute, though changed by interpretation, nevertheless remained in force and applicable to events that transpired before the change occurred. See nn. 6-7, infra, and accompanying text.


http://laws.findlaw.com/us/401/715.html


Интересно также решение суда от 1934 года, где само введение закона о savings рассматривается как доказательство существования доктрины общего права об отмене наказания в момент отмены закона (то есть той доктрины, наличие которой - или, по крайней мере, всеобщий характер которой - отрицается в процитированном выше мнении 1971 года). Приводятся ссылки на решения верховного суда - принятые, очевидно, до появления первого закона о savings в 1871 году - подчеркивающие универсальность этой доктрины.

Вот цитата из этого решения 1934 года:

In case a statute is repealed or rendered inoperative, no further proceedings can be had to enforce it in pending prosecutions unless competent authority has kept the statute alive for that purpose.

The decisions of this Court afford abundant illustration of this principle. In Yeaton (The General Pinkney) v. U.S., 5 Cranch, 281, 283, where the statute under which a ship had been condemned in admiralty had expired while the case was pending on appeal, the Court held that the cause was to be considered as if no sentence had been pronounced. Chief Justice Marshall said that 'it has long been settled, on general principles, that after the expiration or repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law committed while it was in force, unless some special provision be made for that purpose by statute.' Chief Justice Taney observed in Maryland v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 3 How. 534, 552: 'The repeal of the law imposing the penalty, is of itself a remission.' In United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 95, the Court thus stated the principle applicable to criminal proceedings: 'There can be no legal conviction, nor any valid judgment pronounced upon conviction, unless the law creating the offence be at the time in existence. By the repeal the legislative will is expressed that no further proceedings be had under the act repealed.' See, also, Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429, 440; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Rwy. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U.S. 503, 506 , 32 S.Ct. 542.

The government endeavors to avoid the application of this established principle by invoking the general saving provision enacted by the Congress in relation to the repeal of statutes. That provision is to the effect that penalties and liabilities theretofore incurred are not to be extinguished by the repeal of a statute 'unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide,' and to support prosecutions in such cases the statute is to be treated as remaining in force. Rev. St. 13 (1 U.S.C. 29 (1 USCA 29)). [Footnote 2] But this provision applies, and could only apply, to the repeal of statutes by the Congress and to the exercise by the Congress of its undoubted authority to qualify its repeal and thus to keep in force its own enactments. It is a provision enacted in recognition of the principle that, unless the statute is so continued in force by competent authority, its repeal precludes further enforcement.

[Footnote 2] The text of the provision is as follows: 'The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.'


http://laws.findlaw.com/us/291/217.html


Теперь логично поискать материалы конгресса за 1871 год, чтобы понять, какая аргументация предлагалась для введения такого странного закона, отчетливо противоречащего всему тому, что на тот момент считалось общепринятой доктриной права. Ну что же, поищем.

Кстати, в этих решениях несколько раз давалась ссылка на дело United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398 (1888), но линк (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=128&invol=398) оказывается битым, неработающим. Это странно. Попробую найти и это дело.
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